Flashpoints at sea? Legitimization strategy and East Asian island disputes (Japan, China, Russia, Korea)

When does a state seek to defend its sovereign claims at all costs and when is it willing to compromise them? Despite the post-Cold War emergence of interests in territorial disputes as one of the primary sources of interstate conflicts, existing studies have neglected the rich variations in territorial policymaking behaviors that are masked by states' belligerent and adamant rhetoric. Through East Asian island disputes case studies, this dissertation examines the causes of variations in a state's choice of territorial policy. It proposes the “legitimization strategy” model, arguing that state elites' concerns for domestic legitimacy are key determinants of variations in territorial policymaking behavior. A territorial policy is a legitimization strategy for state elites in the realm of foreign policy, calibrated by both international and domestic constraints.; The hypotheses of the model are tested in the case studies chapters that examine three island disputes in the 1990s: between Japan and China over Senkaku/Diaoyu, South Korea and Japan over Tokto/Takeshima, and the former Soviet Union/Russia and Japan over the four Kurile Islands/Northern Territories. The conclusion chapter summarizes the theoretical and empirical findings and discusses their implications for the general study of territorial disputes and IR theories of state action. Regarding the relationship of these Island disputes to East Asian security, the legitimization strategy model forecasts that the festering status quo will continue, but also maintains that the disputes will remain as encapsulated disruptions to regional stability, falling short of triggering armed inter-state conflicts.