| When smaller states act in ways befitting their status as states but belying their status as 'small,' the major theories of international relations are at a loss to explain it. In this dissertation, I develop an alternative theoretical model of international organization I call 'institutional realism.' Adapting both realism and institutionalism into a theoretical framework that takes into account the instrumental use of institutions by states, institutional realism provides a better theoretical framework for understanding the ability of the 'least likely' actors to influence larger and stronger states.; Recognizing the influence potential the rules and decision-making procedures of an organization entail, smaller states consciously and purposefully attempt to manipulate the decision-making rules of an international organization to bind their larger and stronger counterparts, a process I label 'engineering influence.' Furthermore, if smaller states are able to engineer influence during the formative phase of an international organization's lifespan, they can set the organization on a path-dependent course, making future rule changes harder than they otherwise would have been. I examine these arguments primarily in two international organizations: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and the European Community/European Union (EC/EU). |
