Essays on interdependence, institutions, and international conflict

How does economic interdependence affect the prospects for peace between nations? While much has been written on the nexus between trade and conflict, we lack a comprehensive argument and analysis of the relationship between different types of trade, foreign direct investment, and international conflict. I develop an analytical model and empirically test hypotheses from the model on the relationship between strategic and non-strategic commodities, foreign direct investment and militarized conflict. I argue that trade interdependence does not always promote peace between nations. The effects of interdependence are conditional on the type of goods traded and the political relationship between states. Specifically, non-strategic trade interdependence and foreign direct investment promote peace, while strategic trade interdependence between nations lacking political affinity enhances the likelihood of dyadic conflict. This dissertation also extends the interdependence argument to state level behavior by linking economic dependence to the initiation and targeting of militarized interstate disputes. I argue that militarized states dependent on importing strategic commodities are more likely than other states' to initiate militarized disputes. Similarly, weak states with strategic resources are more likely to be targets of militarized disputes. I also find support for a monadic democratic peace. Democracies, in general, are more peaceful, even while controlling for economic development. In a final essay, I argue that assessing the similarity of states' political and economic institutions is central to evaluating their satisfaction with the status quo, and, in turn, the likelihood of conflict between nations. In addition to the previously confirmed pacific effects of political institutional similarity, I find that states with similar economic institutions are less likely to fight each other.