Economic interdependence and democratic peace

This study examines the relationship between economic interdependence and the democratic peace. Theoretically, proponents of the democratic peace argue that the political regime type is a causal factor for peace, which is why democratic states enjoy irenic relations with one another. The democratic peace thesis advances two alternative explanations: (1) structural constraints, such as checks and balances; and (2) normative constraints like democratic values and culture.; This study challenges the liberal assumption that common polities have contributed to peace between democratic states contending that the relationship between the political regime type and peace has not been adequately researched, which is why the liberal peace thesis is not only vulnerable but also wanting in causal mechanism. The democratic peace thesis needs to address the following. First, it should account for why its structural constraints, such as checks and balances and or its democratic public opinion fail to predispose democracies toward peaceful relations with all states, irrespective of their political regime type. Second, it needs to explain why in democracies the publics are more peace-loving than their leaders. Third, the democratic peace proposition has to deal with the issue of endogeniety in the nexus between democracy and peace in which 'democracy' as the independent variable will be correlated with residuals leading to a bias in the inter-democratic peace argument. And fourth, it also has to deal with the level of analysis problem, signifying that a second image level cannot be effectively applied to a third level of analysis. By the same token, what liberals have achieved in their democratic peace argument is an inductive-based correlation between democracy and peace, but what they have failed to establish is a causal link.; The foregoing theoretical ambiguities of the democratic peace explain why the democratic peace can be accounted for better by anchoring the liberal peace thesis in Kant's pacific federation rather than in his pacific union that is proliferation of republics. To this end, this study draws on dyadic trading relations and economic interdependence. Unlike the democratic peace proposition, the economic interdependence structure as suggested in this study is systemic, signifying that the nexus between economic interdependence and peace is not limited only to the internal attribute of regime; rather it is applicable to any dyadic relationship be it democratic or otherwise.; In this study, the economic interdependence structure is generated by interactions of two constituent elements of interdependence, that is, expectations of high future trade, and symmetrical nature of trading ties. If this interdependence structure obtains, it is likely to operate as a constraint upon the conflict propensity of state because in a dyadic relationship like this, both costs and benefits of economic relations are distributed equally between the partners. To test the robustness of the causal logic of the economic interdependence structure, I have subjected both Japan's and Germany's wars against the United States in 1941, and the peaceful policies of the United States, Germany, and Japan toward one another since 1945 to three game theoretic tests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...