Trusting others, trusting God: Concepts of belief, faith and rationality

The topic of trust has been mistreated in philosophy of religion, both in the case of trusting others and trusting God. Trust is a ragged concept; that is, it does not permit of definition, and attempts to define trust neglect important aspects of trust relationships. However, conceptual distinctions can be made between moral and religious trust. The question of how it is rational to trust anyone, with the underlying assumption that trust must be justified, has been the typical focus of philosophers. The author's belief is that a grammatical investigation of the concept of trust can help rectify this mistreatment. The question of the justification of trust is important to philosophy as trust is viewed as a necessary precondition for the existence of society. Hobbes believed that the rationality of trust is ensured by the enforcement of contracts and covenants by a sovereign ruler whose might inspires fear in the citizens. The problem with Hobbes's approach to trust is that it cannot explain how one incurs the obligation to uphold one's promises when one can reasonably get away with neglecting them. Moreover, when an instrumental concept of trust is applied to religious trust, the result is a mischaracterization of religious faith. Faith based upon fear of sanctions cannot inspire worship. Annette Baier's concept of trust fails to break completely with the utility of trust. This difficulty arises from the language of trust. Trust is depicted as a state of mind, the description of which provides the justification of trust. However, in many cases, questions of trust and distrust simply do not arise. Trust is more like a negative concept than a description of a state of mind. Philosophers have tried to ground the rationality of trust in the cooperation underlying language itself, but that cooperation is not moral cooperation. Lars Hertzberg portrays trust as a primitive reaction, part of what it is to see another as a human being. But distrust is equally primitive. Without justification, religious trust is viewed as infantile, but this point of view neglects important grammatical differences between worldly trust and religious trust.