States in transition and defensive alliances: Greece and Turkey in NATO

This dissertation considers the impact of international organizations on the security of weak states through an analysis of the effects of NATO on two member states: Greece and Turkey. The dissertation argues that both the realist and institutionalist schools in international relations are plagued by deficiencies. Specifically, neither school can grapple adequately with the particular problems---both analytical and practical---raised by NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. As the cases of Greece and Turkey illustrate, membership in security arrangements for states undergoing regime transition has a high potential for adverse consequences. The experiences of these countries challenge the widely accepted notion that defensive alliances are unconditionally positive in safeguarding a weak nation's security or sovereignty. They also demonstrate that in the absence of an external threat, states in transition invite greater risks to their sovereignty and security by joining supranational institutions than by remaining independent.; Through an examination of archival materials in Greece and the United States, I examine the terms and conditions of admission attached to Greece and Turkey at the time of their joining NATO. I then trace the subsequent deleterious effects that NATO membership had on these two countries. The consolidation of democracy in each country was delayed. Their bilateral relationship was also harmed. Membership in NATO actually aggravated problems between Turkey and Greece; the alliance proved unable to alleviate the tension or bitterness that arose between Ankara and Athens in the 1950s. The levels of antagonism and insecurity between the two NATO associates grew alarmingly during the era that I have reviewed. Finally, I conclude that the robustness of their sovereignty was degraded by their over-close dependence upon American power.; The difficulties experienced by Greece and Turkey in NATO stand in sharp contrast to the often cited example of France and Germany in NATO. I demonstrate that the relative success of the latter two should be considered unique, not something from which one can draw confident predictions for the future as NATO expands eastward. The research reported here shows the geostrategic characteristics, political development, and historical experience of Greece and Turkey are more germane than Germany and France to recent and prospective members of post-Cold War NATO. States in Eastern Europe that now seek membership in NATO should read the history of Greece and Turkey in the alliance as a cautionary tale: membership in the alliance may entail serious problems for newcomers, far outweighing putative benefits.