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Designing biorisk oversight: Applying design science research to biosafety and biosecurity

Posted on:2017-03-27Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:George Mason UniversityCandidate:Gines, Jonathan SFull Text:PDF
GTID:1466390011999812Subject:Public policy
Abstract/Summary:
Biorisk management establishes the practices, procedures, system processes, and policies to manage laboratory biorisks, which are vital in the daily operations of research institutions involving biological materials, technologies, and scientific information. Biorisk oversight is the core function within biorisk management that continuously monitors those processes, procedures, system processes and polices to grade whether or not research institutions and laboratories are compliant. Biorisk incidents since the 2001 anthrax letter cases have spawned diverse proposals, suggestions, and recommendations to expand oversight. Policy recommendations to strengthen biorisk oversight requires the scientific and security communities to understand the entity interrelationships associated with biosafety and biosecurity, what data is collected, and the shared oversight responsibilities between federal agencies and research institutions. Unlike past biodefense studies, this dissertation adopts the design science research for information systems (DSR-IS) engineering framework to produce visual artifacts that examine the entity interrelationships explaining the research, security, and oversight resources involved with biorisk oversight.;Biorisk is the emerging concept associated with research institutions and microbiological laboratory settings that link the terms biological safety (biosafety) and biological security (biosecurity) to encompass the potential risks associated with the outcomes of laboratory, biological, and infectious agent hazards. The DSR-IS artifacts created to model biorisks were simplified to visualize the entity interrelationships not consistently understood by the scientific, security, and regulatory communities to architect a notional biorisk oversight BSL Registry, suggest a biorisk oversight patchwork map, and formulate recommendations that not only improve oversight, but also augmenting the features of the DSR-IS artifacts afforded. A gap analysis between sample U.S. Biological Weapons Convention -- Confidence Building Measure (BWC-CBM) reports from 2011-2013 and the DSR-IS artifacts was conducted to test the DSR-IS artifacts, which established relevant biorisk oversight elements, such as shared entities, time-based metrics, and oversight mapping between compliance and inspections objectives as concrete prerequisites to implement past USG recommendations.
Keywords/Search Tags:Oversight, Biorisk, DSR-IS artifacts, Security, Biosafety, Research institutions, Recommendations
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