Constitution -making and institutional design. Distributing power between government and opposition in three Argentine constitutions (1853--1860, 1949, 1994)

This dissertation presents an analytical framework to explain the power-concentrating or power-sharing qualities of the institutions of government created in a constitution-making process. It argues that different systems of distributing power between government and opposition can be explained by three causal factors: the expectations of the actors about their future positions, their relative strength and bargaining power, and the procedural constraints and opportunities they face at the time of designing institutions. From this perspective, it is suggested that power-concentrating institutions emerge from contexts where the stronger actor at the time of designing institutions expects to achieve or maintain a majoritarian position in the future. Power-sharing structures, instead, are likely to emerge from contexts where either of the following conditions obtain: (1) the balance of forces among the actors is relatively even, (2) the balance of forces is uneven but the stronger actor expects to be in a minority position in the future, or (3) all parties involved are uncertain about the future balance of forces. These general propositions are applied to explain a more specific institutional outcome, like the power of the executive in a presidentialist system and the different institutional arrangements that may enhance or constrain this power. The analysis is based on a comparative study of three constitution-making episodes in Argentina: 1853--60, 1949, and 1994. While the process of 1853--60 presents the case of mixed structure of government that combined elements of executive dominance with principles of executive-legislative balance, those of 1949 and 1994 respectively reflect the strengthening and the limitation of presidential powers. Different outcomes, this dissertation contends, were caused by variations in the relative strength and bargaining power of the actors involved in the process as well as in the institutional setting under which each constitution was made.