| This study explores the relationship between technological change and international politics through an investigation of "offense-defense theory." The theory contends that international conflict is more likely when technology gives offensive military operations an advantage over defensive operations, whereas peace is more likely when defense gains an advantage. Under offense-dominance, the prospect of quick and decisive warfare exacerbates the security dilemma among states, intensifies arms races, and makes wars of expansion, prevention, and preemption more likely. Under defense-dominance, states are more likely to feel secure and act benignly.; I argue that offense-defense theory is deductively and empirically flawed. I ask two basic questions: First, is there an offense-defense balance of technology that can be used to explain military outcomes? Second, do perceptions or misperceptions, of shifts in the balance affect political decisions to initiate conflict? I conclude that scholars have overstated both the degree to which the balance of technology shapes battlefield outcomes and the influence beliefs of offense or defense dominance have on strategic behavior.; Chapters 1 and 2 summarize offense-defense theory's key role in academic and policy debates; discuss the basic definitions and assumptions required to operationalize offense-defense variables for empirical evaluation; and identify and evaluate the most frequently employed predictions provided by proponents of the theory.; Chapters 3--6 employ the historical case study method to assess how offense-defense predictions fare against the record of four watershed technological innovations since 1850. Chapter 3 explores the emergence of railroads in the nineteenth century. Chapter 4 investigates the small arms and artillery revolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Chapter 5 analyzes armored warfare in the first half of the twentieth century. Chapter 6 considers the nuclear revolution of the second half of the twentieth century.; Chapter 7 summarizes my principal findings. It is sometimes possible to discern shifts in the offense-defense balance in cases of revolutionary technological change, but these shifts are complicated, are not usually profound, and often contradict offense-defense predictions. More importantly, in none of the cases examined did perceived offense or defense dominance play a significant role in decisions to initiate conflict. |
