Taming the electric chameleon: War, offense-defense theory, and the revolution in military affairs

Research question. "Is there a connection between Revolutions in Military Affairs and war, and if so, what are the implications for the RMA underway in the United States today?";This dissertation (1) Examines the concept of the RMA, and the development of Offense-Defense Theory; (2) Conducts a qualitative analysis in light of Offense-Defense Theory of 22 modern cases where RMAs preceded the outbreak of interstate war; (3) Examines in depth one case (Japan before December 1941) where an offensive RMA did appear to make war more likely; (4) Draws conclusions and applies them against the emerging US Information Based RMA; (5) Proposes national security policy/strategy recommendations as a result.;Concerning RMAs, the examination argues that the key issue is not the change in capabilities but the impact on enemies. An RMA is therefore defined as a change in military force which overthrows the enemy strategy, making victory "easy.";Concerning "Offense-Defense Theory" (ODT), the study reviews 30 years of literature and develops definitions which focus not on ways or means, but on ends. Offense is defined as actions which change the strategic status quo; defense as actions which maintain it. ODT is operationalized as: "war is more likely when victorious offense is perceived to be easy.";This leads to Hypotheses 1 that an RMA makes aggressive war more likely, and Hypotheses 2 that it makes preventive or preemptive war more likely.;In 22 cases, only 2 pre-war RMAs were identified as defensive. Of the remaining 20 cases, 80% supported H1. The RMA-inspired promise of easy victory appeared to pull nations into war. Frequently, the promise was over stated and the initiator lost.;The study concludes that the current US National Security Strategy is offensive in nature, promoting change (democracy, free markets, human rights) in the international status quo. Meanwhile, the US National Military Strategy seeks an RMA to "dominate" any enemy. The political urge for change may well coincide with the military promise of easy offense to pull the US into war---perhaps unleashing an information-age version of the unpredictable creature Clausewitz called "a very chameleon."...