The dynamics of institutional control over United States Federal telecommunications policy decisions: The case of 'Adjudicative rule-making decisions' regarding AT&T activities in the arena of long-distance service regulation

This study analyzes policy decisions (that is, “adjudicative rule-making decisions”) made by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the long-term dominant, monopolistic carrier, AT&T, in the U.S. federal long-distance telecommunications service market domain over the 31-year period (1965–1995). With the goal of identifying the determinants of the federal long-distance telecommunications policy decisions which were made in favor of AT&T over other common carriers or public interest groups, this study seeks to test regulation theories regarding interest group power and the roles of political institutions. An empirical model (logit regression) characterizing the conditions under which the FCC actually adopted policy decisions in favor of or against AT&T's interests is developed to understand the response of the FCC and assess the relative and simultaneous effects of interest groups, political institutions, and other contextual factors on the FCC's adjudicative rule-making decisions. The logistic regression analyses show that FCC policy-making is significantly influenced by interactive modes of interest group power, coming from AT&T, other common carriers and other public interest groups, and the roles of political institutions, including the federal agency itself, Congress, the presidents, and the federal courts. Specifically, while confirming the importance of interest group politics and the roles of political institutions in the long-distance service policy domain, two quantitative analyses conducted for the two separate periods (1965–1983 before the break-up of AT&T and 1984–1995 after the event) find that the impacts of business/public interest groups through strong petitions and the federal agency's own past policy-making are more significant upon the federal long-distance service policy decisions after the divestiture of AT&T. Also, the influence of presidents before the break-up of AT&T is the very opposite to that of presidents before the event. Based on the analysis, the study suggests that a complete explanation on the dynamics of federal telecommunications policy-making could be derived by an analytical framework that considers simultaneously the influence of interest group power and political institutions. Future research with an enhanced model combining the details of interest group politics and institutional differences could provide policy analysts with more sound insights into the dynamics of the U.S. federal telecommunications policy-making.