| This study explains why the communist armies of various countries behave differently during political crises, even though their respective parties have politically controlled them for decades. The literature on communist civil-military relations cannot answer the research question primarily because it ignores the impact of opposition challenge on existing party-military relations. My answer to the question consists of two parts. I first analyze the contexts confronting the military. The contexts include opposition challenge to communist rule, the party's response to that challenge, the involvement of a foreign patron country, and the political role of paramilitary organizations. Given the contexts confronting the military, I discuss whether the military will preserve internal unity and, if it remain united, whether it will obey or disobey its party. The military disintegrates in a crisis after the party—the core of a communist system—has failed to contain the challenge of minority separatist movements on the unity of a multi-ethnic country and disintegrated. If the military preserves internal unity, its response to the party's orders is determined by (1) its incentive to disobey the party and (2) its perception of the likelihood of successful disobedience. The first factor is affected by pre-crisis party-military relations. The second factor is determined by the measures that the party uses to prevent military disobedience during the crisis. If the military has incentive to disobey the party and believes that its disobedience will succeed, it disobeys the party's orders. If any one of these two factors is absent, the military executes the party's orders. |
