Strategy for Pandora's children: Stable nuclear proliferation among minor states

How dangerous is nuclear proliferation in the Third World? Developing states cannot duplicate all the technologies and organizations the superpowers used to stabilize their deterrent relationship; does this mean developing states cannot hope to achieve stable nuclear deterrence?;For decades the deterrent relationship between the superpowers was the only sort of nuclear deterrence the world knew, but it is wrong to think it is the only sort possible. Scholars worry about the dangers of nuclear proliferation in general, but nuclear proliferation among states in developing regions is especially worrisome because such states lack the technology and resources for building the hardened second strike systems, early warning networks, communication systems and electronic failsafes the superpowers used to protect and manage their nuclear weaponry. However, this disproportionate concern is derived from 'superpower-centric' models of nuclear deterrence that mistakenly assume minor states will need to duplicate all the complex technologies and organizations that the superpowers employed. In reality, minor proliferators exist in unique strategic contexts characterized by nuclear advantages the superpowers did not have. Rather than focusing on minor proliferators' ability to duplicate the superpowers' capabilities, this analysis focuses on the proportionality between developing states' limited capabilities and their uniquely limited needs. Minor proliferators will have far less than the superpowers, but in the right context, less is more.;My argument has two parts. First, I argue that Third World nuclear states will be what I call limited nuclear proliferators, characterized by very small nuclear arsenals, correspondingly small nuclear target sets, and strategies of opaque nuclear proliferation. Second, using these characteristic conditions, I extrapolate the advantages and alternative means available to minor proliferators in four critical areas of nuclear deterrence stability: strategic threat, crisis stability, command and control stability, and arms race stability. I explore the accuracy of my 'limited means' model of nuclear deterrence in light of the strategic relationships of nuclear proliferators in the Middle East and South Asia. The analysis suggests that nuclear proliferation in developing regions has an excellent chance of resulting in stable deterrent relationships provided nuclear arsenals remain small and opaque. Policy strategies can be engineered accordingly.