A dutiful reading of Kant's political philosophy

A person's initial conception of Kant's political philosophy is often that it is a social contract theory which justifies a narrow or limited role of the state in civil society. The state is thought to be justified only in acting to protect the freedom of individuals. In this dissertation, I develop a broader conception of Kant's political philosophy based on the idea that the state is justified in acting on three sets of duties which are analogous to the juridical, indirect, and imperfect duties of elaborated in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals.;The fourth chapter begins the presentation of the broader conception of Kant's political philosophy by examining several basic ideas in Kant's moral philosophy. The next chapter examines the duties elaborated in The Metaphysics of Morals and explains why one should consider the analogous duties of the state when evaluating Kant's political philosophy. The sixth chapter shows that the state is justified in acting to enforce the juridical duties of members of civil society, provide the conditions needed for individuals to fulfill the indirect duty to promote their own happiness, and provide the conditions needed for the enlightenment of the individuals so they may act on the imperfect duties. The final chapter shows that this broader conception of Kant's political philosophy can overcome the four challenges considered in the second chapter.;The first chapter examines the positions that Kant's political philosophy only justifies the actions of the state which protect the freedom of individuals. The following chapter examines four challenges to Kant's political philosophy. The first two focus on Kant's views of citizenship and rights which are sexist and elitist. The next two identify problems in the narrow conception of Kant's political philosophy. One claims that Kant's conception of justice is too limited. The other asserts that Kant's political philosophy cannot justify actions of the state that are intended to promote a good life for individuals. The third chapter considers the Kantian contractualist accounts of morality and justice presented by T M. Scalon and John Rawls. I claim Scanlon's account can meet the first two challenges and Rawls' view can resolve all four challenges but neither provides an accurate account of Kant's political philosophy.