| The standard two-party spatial model of political competition postulates that all citizens vote, and trivializes any post-electoral policy-making process by assuming that the winning party adopts the policy announced during the electoral campaign. The widely used Median Voter Theorem (MVT) then obtains. However, this elegant theoretical proposition is at odds with reality. The core of this dissertation (chapters 1 and 2) is devoted to show that these assumptions are not innocuous.; The first chapter introduces abstention, a simple yet realistic modification. I show that the main features of the MVT survive to a large extent but subject to some qualifications. First, the winning policy does not bear any necessary relation to the median voter. Second, there exist examples in which the candidates choose different positions at equilibrium. Third, equilibrium may fail to exist or be unique.; In the second chapter, I enrich the theoretical framework to allow for non-trivial policy-setting processes and sophisticated voters who may abstain. First, I show that platform convergence is a non-robust feature created by the winner-takes-all assumption. The lightest influence of the opposition in the policy-making process provokes a divergent tendency in platform setting. Next I show that an equilibrium is characterized by polarized platforms and a moderate policy that consistently differs from the median voter ideal policy. Finally, we show that substantial turnout rates are easily obtained. Abstention occurs among voters with extreme views as well as with moderate views.; In the final chapter (a joint work with John Roemer), we ask, how should international aid be distributed? The most common view is according to some utilitarian formula that maximizes the average growth rate or the growth rate of income of aid recipient countries. A recent publication by the World Bank (1998) demonstrates the importance of good economic management in transforming aid into economic growth. We identify good economic management with effort, and calculate how aid should be distributed to equalize opportunities for achieving growth, according to Roemer's (1998) equal opportunity theory. We also calculate the aid allocation according to a utilitarian view, and compare both of them to the actual allocation of aid. |
