| In this dissertation, I argue that the key features of Congressional organization are not best viewed as the solution to a single collective goods problem, but rather are better understood as the products of "disjointed pluralism." By disjointed pluralism, I mean that no single kind of coalitional interest exerts a dominant impact on the design of legislative institutions, and that the interactions and tensions among competing coalitions promoting a range of collective interests drive the dynamics of institutional development. The coalitional interest in majority party reputation, for example, has to compete with members' shared interest in district-based particularism, and with members' pursuit of ideological success through cross-party coalitions.;I examine the relationship between the multiple collective interests shared by members and the kind of legislature that they build over time by identifying and analyzing important institutional changes in four periods of Congressional history, 1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989. My case studies show that different interests emerge as particularly important in different eras, that multiple collective interests typically shape each instance of institutional change, and that specific institutions often develop through an accumulation of innovations inspired by competing motives, engendering a tense layering of new arrangements on top of preexisting structures. My findings suggest that Congressional institutions are made up of the often ambiguous or contradictory results of disjointed, pluralistic change processes. |
