Analysis Of Interest Mechanism Of Collective Land Expropriation And Retention System From The Perspective Of Institutional Economics

With the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization in China,a large number of rural land has been expropriated.Due to the urban-rural dual land management system in China,which leads to the incomplete of collective land property rights,a huge interest game also arises,resulting in a large number of problems and contradictions in rural collective land acquisition.A large number of farmers have lost the land they depend on for survival,and they have not got enough land compensation.Instead,they have become farmers who are lack of security and low viability.The problem of land and the problem of farmers' survival has gradually changed into the contradiction between survival,security and fairness.Land acquisition and retention resettlement,as a system innovation beyond the statutory compensation method of land acquisition and resettlement at the national level.Since the implementation of Shenzhen in 1980 s,it has been popularized in 22 provinces.This system enables the rural collective and farmers to obtain the value-added benefits of the land,improves the actual compensation level for the farmers who have been expropriated,achieves good results in establishing long-term production and life security for the farmers who have lost their land,eases the contradiction of land acquisition,and is fully affirmed in theory and Practice.However,in the process of implementing the system,there are some problems,such as lack of law,unclear property rights,scattered layout,extensive management,rent-seeking corruption,etc.in the interest game,and the local government occupies the dominant position,obtains most of the interests,and the situation of farmers' interests damaged still exists.Based on the research literature of land expropriation compensation and its system at home and abroad,and on the basis of summarizing the development process and performance of collective land expropriation and retention system,this paper analyzes the interest pattern of collective land expropriation and retention system by using game theory,and concludes that the interest mechanism of collective land expropriation and retention system is in an unbalanced state,and analyzes the causes of the imbalance.From the three theoretical dimensions of transaction cost theory,property right theory and institutional change theory,this paper analyzes the direction of reconstructing the interest mechanism of the system.The transaction cost must be reduced through institutional reform,the ownership of property right must be clear,the legitimate rightsand interests of the interest subject must be protected,and the interests of local government,village collective and farmers must be taken into account to achieve the balance of interests based on the maximization of the interests of the three parties.At the same time,from the four aspects of interest generation,interest representation,interest distribution and interest protection,this paper analyzes the ways to build the interest balance mechanism of the system.Finally,around the improvement of collective land acquisition and retention system,seven suggestions are put forward:1.clarify the legal status and improve the efficiency level.According to the clear direction of the land management law,the paper systematically summarizes the normative documents and practical experience about the resettlement of the land to be retained in various places,and should make corresponding provisions on the concept,nature,use restriction and other contents of the land to be retained in the detailed rules for the implementation of the land management law and other laws and regulations and normative documents.At the same time,we should give full play to the flexibility of local legislation,combine with local reality,and make provisions for the system of collective land acquisition and retention according to the situation of local laws and regulations.2.Clarify the ownership of property rights and the rights and interests of all parties.Set up corresponding rural collective economic organizations to further improve the degree of farmers' organization.We should make clear the detailed rules of rural collective land entering the market and shorten the different income gap of land ownership.3.improve the content of the policy and standardize the implementation of the system.Set the proportion of land to be reserved reasonably,prepare the special plan of land to be reserved,and solve the problem of difficult implementation of the indicators of land to be reserved.Standardize the management of income distribution of the land.4.deepen system reform and improve system efficiency.We will reform land acquisition procedures and strictly implement the pre approval announcement.To explore a diversified way of compensation to meet the diversified needs of the village collective and farmers.Drive revenue quantification to individuals.Innovating the development mode of the reserved land.5.Increase support and improve development efficiency.Local governments should increase investment promotion and support,and increase training and exchange for village collective cadres and farmers.Actively guide financial institutions to providefinancing support,establish a clear and operable access mechanism,and guard against the operational risks of the development zone.6.Improve the security system and protect the interests of farmers.Establish a diversified social security mechanism for the landless farmers,such as pension,medical care,employment,etc.We will improve the system of letters and visits and unblock the channels for farmers to express their interests.7.Strengthen supervision and assessment,and establish correct guidance.Through the target assessment,guide the local government to consider the land acquisition and retention in three aspects of comprehensive economic,social and political interests.We will strengthen supervision over the distribution of interests in the development of village collective funds and reserved land.