Justice, pluralism, and social stability: The political philosophy of John Rawls

John Rawls now presents and defends his theory of "justice as fairness" as a form of "political liberalism." Focusing on Political Liberalism (1993), this dissertation critically examines the main features of Rawls's recent work in liberal political philosophy.;Chapter One first introduces "justice as fairness," drawing on Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). It then introduces Rawls's more recent work as responsive to the fact that in his 1971 presentation of "justice as fairness" he assumed a degree of moral consensus among citizens most unlikely, on his own account, to arise or endure within a stable, free, and open society.;Chapters Two through Four examine critically the main elements of Rawls's political liberalism. Chapter Two concerns Rawls's freestanding public justification for liberal principles of political justice. It argues against Rawls's continued use of the original position argument, and proposes an alternative form of argument. Chapter Three examines the idea of an overlapping consensus, central to Rawls's account of the stability of a liberal society, and concludes that this idea is not needed and ought not be invoked to resolve stability issues. Chapter Four takes up the ideal of public reason. It proposes an improved argument for this ideal and clarifies the relationship between a society's stage of political development and the scope and content of its public reason.;Chapters Five, Six, and Seven undertake to improve Rawls's account of political liberalism in two fundamental ways. Chapter Five revises Rawls's account of public reason (along lines Rawls embraced in 1996) and then develops, without falling into a perfectionist civic humanism, a conception of liberal democratic citizenship more robust and detailed than the conception Rawls offers. Chapter Six addresses the social reproduction of liberal democratic citizenship under conditions of pluralism, paying special attention to the need for and justification of compulsory education. Chapter Seven examines whether and how it is possible, consistent with liberal principles of political justice, to organize and govern a system of compulsory education. The dissertation concludes on a cautiously optimistic note about the prospects for liberalism in societies like the United States.