| This dissertation applies theoretical insights from transaction cost economics to explain and predict the organizational form of cooperative agreements between Eastern and Western Europe in areas of regional environmental and political concern. It examines five contracting problems related to nuclear power safety and acid rain, and describes the history of international negotiations to manage these problems. It argues that the level of interdependence in a given issue area, or costly effects experienced in one state due to activities and decisions of other states, along with the level of transactional vulnerability, or sunk costs invested in support of a particular contractual relationship among these states, are key determinants of the governance structures states choose to facilitate cooperation in that issue area.;Empirically, the dissertation traces the evolution of three sets of institutional arrangements related to nuclear safety: governance for western nuclear safety assistance to Eastern Europe, negotiations of a global convention on safety standards for nuclear power plants, and contracts among utilities and multilateral banks to build new nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. Next it studies European acid rain, chronicling the history of international acid rain controls within the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and the European Union, and finally examining institutional arrangements for burden-sharing to promote European bargains on emissions reduction, including bilateral aid transfers and proposals for multilateral burden sharing.;Political actors have a wide range of choice among institutional arrangements to facilitate international cooperation, from simple market-type exchanges, to arbitration-type regimes that provide information and enhance reputation effects, to self-enforcing agreements such as issue-linkage, to supranational governance. The governance structures states devise to manage their cooperative relations affects outcomes of cooperation, by influencing the bargains states make and how well those bargains stick. This research shows that patterns of interdependence and sunk costs in cooperative relationships with particular states strongly condition the choices states make between these institutional structures to facilitate mutually beneficial international cooperation while protecting against opportunism. |
