| This dissertation presents a three-level hierarchical approach which models carrier interactions in international maritime freight transportation networks. Ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators are considered. Port terminal operators, providing transportation services within a port complex, are regarded as a special type of carrier, based on their behavior. The three types of carriers make pricing and routing decisions at different parts of the multimodal network, having hierarchical relationships. Ocean carriers are regarded as the leaders in a maritime shipping market. Port terminal operators are the followers of ocean carriers as well as the leaders of land carriers. The individual carrier problem is formulated at each level using Nash equilibrium in the competitive environment and compensation principle in the collusive environment, respectively. Interactions among different types of carriers are captured in three-level models according to the different carrier environment. Subsequently, shipper-carrier interactions are captured in bi-level models when carriers are the leaders and shippers are the followers. Shippers determine the production, consumption and distribution of goods using spatial price equilibrium. Shippers are users of transportation services, therefore they choose a sequence of carriers based on the carriers' decisions. The concepts of Stackelberg game and multi-leader-follower game are applied to multi-level games. Heuristic algorithms are developed to solve the carrier and shipper problems. This work contributes to the body of the multimodal freight network problem literature by providing a novel methodology to formulate multi-level hierarchical interaction models. The dissertation assists in understanding of the dynamics and decision-making processes of various stakeholders involved in international freight transportation via waterways. |
