| Within channels of distribution, there has always been some degree of cooperation among channel members. In many cases, channel members actively cooperate with one another in competition against other channels. However, competing channels of distribution also have common interests, including controlling intra-channel opportunism. This research focuses on the use of reputation as a mechanism for controlling intra-channel opportunism, and seeks to answer: Is it rational to give competitors information about a channel member's reputation? When is it best for competing channels to cooperate or compete? Is opportunism affected by industry practices?; This study investigates whether channels of distribution use reputation as a method of controlling opportunistic behavior. Under a reputation mechanism, opportunistic channel members could face both intra-channel and inter-channel sanctions; therefore, opportunistic behavior on the part of a channel member could result in that member losing the ability to conduct exchanges with outside parties, as well as with the aggrieved party.; There is a discussion on the major theories for controlling opportunistic behavior within exchanges and transactions, followed by a discussion of the role reputation plays within this framework. A model of how reputation influences opportunism was developed, and then empirically tested. |
