From silent acquiescence to active resistance: Labor leaders' responses to market-oriented economic reform in Mexico, 1982--2000

Labor unions have responded in various different ways to market-oriented economic reforms. Mexico is a particularly interesting case for studying the attitudes of trade unions towards reform because, while the majority of trade unions supported drastic economic changes, some others adopted combative strategies to deal with the same measures.; This dissertation presents an informal rational choice model to account for the variation in the responses of union leaders to three types of reform: privatizations, stabilization policies, and labor law reform. Specifically, it is argued that such responses can be explained in terms of three variables: regime type, degree of union democracy, and partisan allegiances of the leader. The dissertation evaluates the responses of the leaders of three Mexican labor unions; two in the electrical sector and one in the telecommunications sector.; The cases presented in this study show that where strong partisan links to the governing party represent the most salient resource of the union leader, support to economic reform represents a very effective way to obtain concessions from the regime. Conversely, where high levels of internal democracy prevail, the union leader tends to engage in combative actions against the economic reforms in order to preserve his position within the union.; The analysis also shows the unequal impact that political democratization has upon union leaders. Leaders who enjoyed privileged access to the authoritarian regime saw their partisan links weaken as democratization progressed while the more democratic context benefited democratically elected leaders, who could exploit the increase in civil liberties in order to pursue confrontational strategies that had not been available under the authoritarian regime.; The evidence presented in this work suggests that the new challenges posed by an open economy may be better handled by union leaders who have the capacity to handle the need for productivity gains rather than leaders who have the ability to bargain for access to political patronage, which in turn points to the potential difficulties facing the majority of Mexican union leaders under a market-led economic model and a democratic political regime.