Public choice perspectives on current issues in international economics

This dissertation consists of three essays that explore different current economic issues: economic sanctions, economic integration and immigration policy. While each essay is unique in its contribution, all are linked by their utilization of public choice models, and their analysis of political as well as economic implications.;The second chapter of this dissertation uses a dictatorship model to analyze how trade embargoes artificially raise the price of imports and make sanctions rents possible for domestic producers and smugglers. The ruling regime may gain some of these rents, which allow it to increase its control over the country, making the sanctions ineffective. The nature of groups in opposition to the autocracy plays an important role in determining whether sanctions will be effective. In the absence of a reasonably well organized opposition group, the sanctions may only fortify the dictator's position.;Public policy debates on the creation of NAFTA as well as other free trade areas suggest that a division of opinion often exists between capital and organized labor. Chapter Three uses a two-factor public choice model to study the nature of each factor's willingness to join a free trade area. The chapter demonstrates that the existence of political markets can have effects which may reverse the expected position taken by each factor based on a model which ignores the political consequences of integration.;Chapter Four evaluates the extent and structure of immigration policy in a public choice context where the efficacy of competing interest groups ultimately determines immigration policy. The effectiveness of each interest group will, in part, be determined by its ability to subdue the desires of its members to free ride. In addition, voter ideologies, ethnic and family ties, the skill level of immigrant workers, the timing gap between citizenship and political activity, and the costs of enforcing immigration laws all play an integral part in the outcome of immigration policy. The chapter demonstrates that the existence of competing desires within each interest group can explain why we see immigration law imposed on a country-by-country basis.