Premature audit sign-offs and the underreporting of chargeable time in public accounting: Examination of an ethical decision-making model

The underreporting of chargeable time and premature audit sign-offs can adversely affect public accounting firms. While prior studies of these activities have generally lacked a strong theoretical foundation, the decision model used in this study integrates elements of cognitive moral development, moral evaluation, opportunity, and individual moderators. Accountants employed by six public accounting firms completed a questionnaire designed to measure the model elements, and responded to two case scenarios involving underreporting and premature audit sign-off activities.;Path analyses of the decision models do not support expected relations between model elements. Because there were no significant paths associated with the moral development element, each of the path models was reduced to a single multiple regression.;Results suggest accountants view underreporting and premature sign-offs as having different ethical dimensions. The likelihood of underreporting appears affected by reward expectation, teleological evaluation, and the time an accountant has spent in practice. The significance of reward expectation and teleological evaluation suggests that accountants may use a consequences-based approach when deciding whether to underreport chargeable time.;Results also suggest that as accountants become more experienced, they become less likely to prematurely sign-off. Participants with an internal locus of control were less likely to prematurely sign-off.;Three other issues--impact of time budget pressure on underreporting and premature sign-offs, influence of organizational sanctions on underreporting, and effect of procedure materiality on premature sign-offs--were examined. Results indicate that the likelihood of underreporting and the percentage of time written off generally increase with time budget pressure, while the likelihood of premature sign-off activity appears unaffected. Results also suggest that codes of conduct and a threat of termination may reduce the likelihood of underreporting. Finally, participants are more likely to prematurely sign-off on an audit procedure if they believe the procedure is immaterial to performance of the audit.