Firm management of scientific information: The predictors and implications of openness versus secrecy

This dissertation presents a model that seeks to explain R&D performance differences in research-intensive companies. The primary theoretical model builds on the well-established theory that science is a public good, but augments it with a game-theoretic argument for individual firm choices of openness or secrecy. This game-theoretic model utilizes the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma with modifications such that an individual firm is player one while the scientific community is player two. Similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimal, though difficult to reach, solution is to cooperate through publication of scientific articles. The relative openness versus secrecy of twenty pharmaceutical firms is examined over a period of thirteen years.; This dissertation also examines how R&D performance impacts corporate performance. It explores how patents are related to new molecular entities (NME's), and further how NME's are related to changes in a firm's market-to-book ratio. Additionally, this dissertation investigates a variety of predictor variables of scientific information openness including: research-lab demographics, top-management team demographics, type of business strategy, and the nature and extent of external linkages.; The results of this dissertation are as follows: firms that have more scientific publications have more innovations as measured by patents; top management team demographics and business strategy are good predictors of scientific information openness; increased patenting activity is associated with more NME'S being approved; and the number of NME's is highly correlated with changes in corporate performance as measured by market-to-book ratios.