Trade talks: United States-Japan automobile trade negotiations from a two-level analysis

This dissertation explores sources of variation in international cooperation by examining two cases of US-Japan automobile trade negotiations (1980--81 and 1993--95).;Despite tremendous variation in some cases of international cooperation, the existing approaches of international cooperation are not sufficient to provide satisfying accounts of the variation because of their theoretical focus on systemic-level variables.;This dissertation argues that variation in international cooperation occurs because cooperation is determined not only by systemic variables but also by domestic variables. This study employs a two-level game approach that considers both domestic and systemic variables in order to understand variation in international cooperation. It argues that the size of "win-sets" (choices available to each country, determined by the aforementioned variables) determines the process and outcome of cooperation. This study asserts that when both countries involved have a large size of win-sets, cooperation is more likely to be secured and vice versa. In terms of outcome, the relative size of win-sets affects the distribution of the joint gains from cooperation.;The arguments of this study are tested in the context of a comparison made between the two different cases of the US-Japan auto trade negotiations (1980--81 and 1993--95). The analysis of these two cases supports this author's arguments by showing that both cases of the negotiations were affected by both international and domestic variables. Also, the large size of win-sets on the Japanese side and the small size of win-sets on the American side resulted in American success in the final agreement and provided for a fairly smooth process during the 1980--81 negotiations. However, when both sides had small sizes of win-sets during the majority of the 1993--95 negotiations, processes proved to be highly contentious and agreement was not reached until the size of win-sets on the American side enlarged. Thus, the Japanese side, which maintained a small size of win-sets, obtained the more favorable outcome in the final agreement.;Therefore, the findings of this study suggest that the two-level game approach, which considers domestic as well as systemic variables, is quite useful and appropriate in explaining variation in international cooperation.