The Two-Level Games Of U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions And Negotiations

The U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), in the tenure of George H.W. Bush, the41st president of the U.S., was a very important bilateral trade agreement, and it was also relatively special in all U.S. trade negotiations. In addition to the unprecedented synthesis and systematization of the contents of the negotiation, the SII also broke through the general framework of bilateral trade negotiations, and directly came to the U.S.’s and Japan’s domestic political and economic system. The SII represented a new pattern of bilateral trade negotiations. This thesis makes use of Robert Putnam’s two-level games theory, and empirically researches on the U.S. structural impediments negotiation, and focuses on analyzing the interaction of the negotiation between the U.S.’s gaiatsu and the Japan’s response. According to the two-level games theory, the U.S.-Japan structural impediments negotiation can be roughly decomposed into the international level which negotiators bargain around each issue, and the domestic level which the SII is approved and ratified in both countries. The International Bargain is closely related to the U.S.’s and Japan’s comprehensive national strength, the tradition of the foreign trade policy, and the decision-making regime. The Domestic Game forms win-sets by means of interests of main actors, the domestic political system and negotiation strategies three aspects, which determine the final outcome of the negotiation. The two-level games theory is an important approach of International Political Economy in analyzing the interaction of international and domestic politics, its instrumental role cannot be ignored.This thesis is mainly consisted of the following parts.The first part is the introduction. It proposes the background of the topic and the research significance. It sorts out the relevant literature from the SII and the two-level games theory two aspects, and outlines the research method and the framework.The second part leads to the main analysis tool of this thesis:the two-level games theory. The theoretical basis of Putnam’s two-level games theory is the widespread use and deep development of the level-of-analysis of international relations. Therefore, firstly, this part traces the intrinsic relations between the level-of-analysis of International Political Economy and the two-level games theory. Secondly, it elaborates the important variables and the main contents of the two-level games theory. Lastly, after introducing the two-level games theory, it obtains the further development, not only the applicability of the theory, but also the scientificness has improved.The third part is the negotiation background and the process of the SII. The U.S.-Japan structural impediments negotiation was an important bilateral negotiation concerning the multilateral trade system in the international system transition. The direct and underlying causes were inseparable from the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance system. In addition, this part also analyzes the main purpose of the U.S.-Japan negotiation and the relevant measures.The fourth part is the international bargain of the SII, it and the fifth part compose the core of this thesis. The International Bargain had been focusing on structural impediments issues related to Japan. This part contains the international factors affecting bilateral negotiations, and the U.S.’s gaiatsu and the Japan’s response in issues of the structural impediments negotiation.The fifth part is the domestic game of the SII. The domestic game is the decisive segment in the overall structural impediments negotiation, only the U.S.’s and Japan’s win-sets form intersection can the SII finally be ratified. This part analyzes the size of the U.S.’s and Japan’s win-sets, the ratified reasons and processes of the SII in both countries.