Level Game Analysis Of Sino-us Wto Negotiations

The analysis of China-US relations can be enhanced by using some concepts derived from negotiation theory and two-level bargaining. This article delineates such a"two-level games"approach and uses it to explain the China-US WTO negotiation in 1999.To assess the effects of domestic constraints on inter-state negotiations, six propositions about bargaining strategies and domestic supports ratios are used to examine the politics of this bilateral negotiation. The resulting empirical study indicates that the April deal was initially possible because Chinese leaders defected against their domestic WTO opponents to cooperate with the US. The ultimate rejection of this deal, meanwhile, resulted from the US defection against China due to the American leadership's perceived need to cooperate with its domestic anti-China groups. The success of the November agreement , in turn, emerged largely as the result of mutual concession on those issues that had greater impact on each side's domestic support ratios. By illustrating the failure of the April negotiation and the success of the November deal, the"two-level negotiations"approach provides a theoretically informed and empirically detailed explanation of the China-US WTO agreement.