| This dissertation examines the nature of power in land use decisions that contribute to the production of environmental inequality. By analyzing land use conflicts concerning who decides, who profits, and who pays when it comes to the construction of urban infrastructure, I identify mechanisms that culminate in the disproportionate placement of hazardous facilities in low-income communities of color. Specifically, by tracing decisions about the plan to build a new international border crossing in the Southwest Detroit neighborhood of Delray, I demonstrate how economic and political inequalities incentivize the placement of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) in low-income, vulnerable communities. I examine three phases of the decision-making process: the initial proposal regarding where to place the facility, the response by the host community, and the negotiation process involved in responding to the community's concerns. Drawing from fieldwork, interviews with residents, activists, and elected officials, and an analysis of media coverage, I explain the emergence of the Southwest Detroit Community Benefits Coalition and why local stakeholders organized to conditionally support the new bridge, rather than oppose it, despite fears about contamination and relocation. I argue that the campaign for a community benefits agreement (CBA) resulted from a legacy of divestment and industrialization within the neighborhood, combined with the belief that residents lacked the political power to prevent the construction. Thus, a "not-in-my-backyard" (NIMBY) campaign was effectively organized out of the political process, despite concerns about health impacts. I then trace the community benefits campaign, illuminating mechanisms through which the Delray group was manipulated, tokenized, and silenced. Nearly all of the extant literature on CBAs draws its sample of cases from neighborhoods that are in the process of or have successfully completed a CBA negotiation. No existing research has examined the power dynamics that shape a community's ability to compel the developer to negotiate in the first place. By entering the community at an earlier policy-making state, I am able to demonstrate how political and economic inequalities contribute to environmental inequality. The dissertation closes with suggestions for how communities and policy-makers can more effectively prevent the reproduction of environmental injustice. |
