Balance of force, balance of mind: Nuclear rivalry and arms control

Under what conditions will rivals choose to accept mutual constraints, limitations, and even reductions on their capabilities for waging war? Contemporary political science lacks a strong theoretical basis for understanding this behavior, despite the fact that states in the modern era continue to negotiate and enter into arms control arrangements. This study contributes a theoretical framework and empirical analysis identifying the conditions under which nuclear-armed rivals might choose to curb their deadly arsenals. Traditional theories grounded in classical deterrence theory suggest arms control serves to preserve a deterrent status quo and prevent expensive and destabilizing arms competition; it should therefore only be expected when rivals feel secure in the strength and effectiveness of their respective retaliatory capabilities. This study suggests a more complicated (yet still predictive) causal logic in which this balance of force is dynamically interactive with militarized hostility and rivals' convergence or divergence in how they think---both normatively and instrumentally---about the role of nuclear weapons in their national security. The argument is illustrated through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of bilateral arms control interactions among nuclear-armed strategic rivals from 1949 to the present. Further analysis is provided through in-depth case studies of arms control dynamics between three pairs of contemporary nuclear rivals---the United States and Russia, India and Pakistan, and the United States and China.