Grisez, Finnis and the proportionalists: Disputes over commensurability and moral judgement in natural law

This dissertation had three purposes: (1) present the system of natural law developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis; (2) display and examine their quarrel with that group of moralists they label "proportionalists;" (3) adjudicate crucial areas of conflict to advance a person-centered fundamental morality.; Chapter One presented the Grisez-Finnis system. It noted: their emphasis on intentionality, as opposed to metaphysical anthropology, as the ground of their theory of practical reason--morality; and their identification of objective principles for grounding moral absolutes.; Chapter Two detailed their critique of the "proportionalists," including Richard McCormick S.J. These are charged with: violating value incommensurability by trying to determine rightness by simple weighing; neglecting the way willing shapes an agent's basic dispositions--moral character, particularly in intending means; and, emphasizing emotional attitude as constituting moral character instead of recognizing attitude--character as one's "volitional self-disposition," to be ordered and constrained by rational principles.; Chapter Three presented proportionalist responses (or possible responses) to the critique. While some incompleteness and vagueness was observed, the fundamental charges of Grisez and Finnis seemed to be unconfirmed.; Chapter Four further examined two crucial disputed areas: (1) the possibilities of justifying actions by ordering values; (2) the way intention--action impacts on moral character. Use was made of tools provided by the theorists already considered, with additional insights from: other natural law theorists, e.g. H. Veatch; R. Sokolowski's phenomenological perspective; and some elements of a nuanced noncognitivism. A person-centered point of view was established as key to valuing and justifying.; I concluded that a person-centered morality did offer a higher good in light of which basic goods could be ordered, opening some possibility of "Doing Evil to Achieve Good", i.e. using harmful means for a proportionately good end. Personal moral goodness was identified in terms of one's basic commitments--basic volitional and emotionl self-dispositions. Actions and elements of actions are to be evaluated, as to effect on moral goodness, according to how they express and affect basic commitments.