Natural ethical facts: Evolution, connectionism, and moral cognition

Naturalizing ethics has been a problematic philosophic enterprise owing to theoretical arguments regarding the impossibility of a systematic reductive relationship between the natural and the normative, and to difficulties in dealing scientifically with moral cognition. Here, I attempt a synoptic reconciliation of the sciences with a naturalized conception of morality, beginning with a Quinean refutation of Moore's “open question argument” and Hume's “naturalistic fallacy.” We can improve our understanding of the nature of moral theory and its place in moral judgment by treating morality as a natural phenomenon subject to constraints from and ultimately reduced to the sciences, particularly cognitive science and biology. Treating morality as a matter of proper biological function, partially fixed by our modern evolutionary history, and with a concomitant emphasis on skillful action in the world, sheds light on just what kind of creatures we are, cognitively speaking. Connectionist conceptions of cognition can best reconstruct the embodied mental modeling required for proper functioning on this picture and can also account for other gross moral psychological phenomenon, cohering well with the neurobiology of judgment and giving them ample explanatory power. The theory of moral cognition I defend is rooted in a pragmatic construal of knowledge and in a modern, biologically informed neo-Aristotelianism. Exploring these roots, particularly as they manifest themselves in John Dewey's conception of moral deliberation, sheds light on the instrumental functional role of moral theory and also helps distinguish this approach from other less fruitful naturalistic undertakings. I discuss practical implications, regarding the nature and form of our collective character development institutions and our methods for moral reasoning, that arise from this approach. Modern history proper functions sanction the development of deep friendships, acting to alleviate the suffering of others, structuring social organizations liberally and democratically, supporting instruments of sociability such as truth-telling, and welcoming some variability in experiments in living. I conclude that living well depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the consequences this will have for the way we live and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions.