| It is usually supposed that it is possible to use one or another traditional moral theory (roughly, Aristotelian, Kantian or Utilitarian morality) to provide an adequate theoretical framework from within which to express the normative commitments of classical Marxism, but it is argued here that such a proposal fails. Classical Marxism presupposes a conception of human nature radically at odds with standard accounts of human nature assumed by traditional moral theories, and this conception serves as the basis for Marx's critique and rejection of traditional moral perspectives. Specifically, the traditional moral agent is thought to have a fixed or unchanging nature, whereas the Marxist theory of human nature is predicated on the idea that individuals create and change their nature through their activity. The Marxian account of human nature is therefore thoroughly historical and as such stands opposed to the ahistorical conceptions of human nature presupposed by traditional moral theories.;This negative conclusion leads to an examination of alternative ways of interpreting the normative commitments implicit in classical Marxism. It is shown that the Marxian critique of traditional moral theories is in fact a critique of the requirements of moral agency that those theories set down. This critique, moreover, converges in important respects with some contemporary criticisms of standard accounts of moral agency (e.g. by Williams, Stocker, Gilligan, Blum). Finally, an attempt is made to reconceptualise moral agency along lines suggested by the Marxian and contemporary critiques of traditional moral theory. |
