| The question that has not yet been dealt with is why Kant was interested in pragmatic anthropology, and how it developed in relationship to his critical thinking. In the first chapter, I discuss the origin of the anthropology lectures. I argue that the lectures did not develop out of the empirical psychology parts of Kant's metaphysics lectures, as some German scholars assert, but rather they evolved out of Kant's interests in cosmology and out of his lectures on physical geography.;For this reason, the Anthropology cannot in any way be identified with psychology. It is "knowledge of the world," not of the inner psychology of human beings. Therefore, it can have a critical nature, whereas psychology can never be critically founded. I then show that the themes of the Anthropology are present in Kant's early works on natural philosophy, cosmology, physical geography, and race.;In the second chapter, I argue that the practical anthropology, which is the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, is not pragmatic anthropology, though a part of it, and, therefore, pragmatic anthropology is not the empirical part of his moral theory. The transcendental and critical grounds of the Pragmatic Anthropology do not lie only in Kant's moral theory, but also in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, insofar as reflective judgment is the critical faculty that founds his transcendental anthropology, a theory of human nature in general which is presupposed throughout the Pragmatic Anthropology.;I lay out the four predispositions which are the explicit theme of the Anthropology and show how these are teleological. I conclude with some reflections on how we might consider the relationship between the moral and natural destinies of human beings. The intent is not to show the anthropological presuppositions of Kant's critical works, but rather to show that his anthropological interests are not in conflict with his critical philosophy. |
