| What influences the course of legal change? This question has been largely ignored by judicial scholars, who have instead focused their efforts on explaining judicial decision making. I expect that the shape of legal rules is influenced by preferences of judges and the relative bargaining positions of the parties in conflict, as well as the position of the court in the broader political environment. The strength of each litigant is a function of the resources they can bring to bear, the expertise of their attorneys, and the amicus support they receive. The position of the court in the broader political environment is influenced by the stands taken by the president, Congress, and the public.;This dissertation systematically examines the influence of the courts' political composition, the litigation environment, and the political environment on the occurrence of legal change and the direction of that change. To test this explanation of legal change, I examine the development of three legal doctrines: the federal common law of public nuisance, the prohibition against employment discrimination enacted in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Since different patterns, or norms, of interpretation may prevail in the common law, statutory law, and constitutional law, the influence of the extra-legal factors may vary systematically between these areas of the law.;I find evidence that the occurrences of legal change and the direction of legal development are influenced by these extra-legal factors. The court's composition, as well as elements of the litigation and political environments, influences legal change. Despite this finding, I also find evidence that the influence of these extra-legal factors varies with the patterns of interpretation. While explanations of legal change based on these factors are successful in the common law and constitutional law where judges have significant discretion to evoke legal change, this explanation of legal change is not successful in statutory law where judges' discretion is arguably more constrained. |
