Armies and the balance of military power in Europe, 1904-1914

This dissertation is a historical study of how armies in Europe changed during the decade before the outbreak of the First World War and how their strength relative to one another affected strategic and political decisions. It addresses the questions of whether the balance of military power in Europe changed significantly during the period, whether this change was perceived by contemporary leaders, and whether it affected their actions in diplomatic crises and their decision to go to war in 1914. The form is that of a narrative account, running from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904/5 to the outbreak of the First World War. The main primary sources are documents from state and military archives in France, Germany, Austria, Italy and England.;The results show that perceptions of the balance of military power did change in the decade before the First World War, and, in interaction with political and diplomatic developments, influenced the decisions of statesmen in the series of international crises that ended in the outbreak of war. The most important feature of this change was the absolute incapacity of the Russian army to wage a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904/5. Russian weakness tempted statesmen in Berlin and Vienna to resort to threats of war in diplomatic confrontations, which in turn provoked reactions from the Entente powers. The apparent recovery of Russia's capacity to fight in a European war by the time of the second Moroccan crisis confronted Germany and Austria-Hungary with a coalition of rivals which seemed likely to grow stronger in the future. There followed an unprecedented land-armaments race between the European powers from 1912 onwards, as each attempted to readjust the military balance in its favor. The resulting atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome of the July crisis of 1914 than it would have been a decade earlier.