Politics, trade, and development: Soviet economic aid to the non-communist Third World, 1955-1989

This dissertation provides a systematic quantitative analysis of the objectives underlying Soviet foreign economic aid to non-communist Third World countries during the period from 1955 through 1989. It seeks answers to two fundamental questions: (1) Why did the Soviet Union extend economic assistance to some Third World countries and not to others? and (2) What determined the amount of aid extended to individual recipients? The answers to these questions in turn contribute to our understanding of the overall qualities of Soviet-Third World relations during the period.;In contrast to most previous studies, the results in this dissertation indicate that the Soviet Union pursued a combination of all three objectives--political, trade, and developmental--through its foreign economic aid program. All three objectives were influential in each Soviet leadership period. The results also suggest a high level of policy volatility, due in large part to changes in the list of countries receiving Soviet economic assistance. Overall, the results support the interactionist perspective on Soviet-Third World relations, and are similar to results of previous studies of the U.S. foreign economic aid program.;The policy implications of two competing perspectives on Soviet-Third World relations--strategic and interactionist--are determined with respect to three objectives: politics, trade, and development. A model of the Soviet foreign economic aid allocation process comprising the three objectives is then operationalized as a set of one dependent variable and eight independent variables. The model is tested using Tobit analysis on a pooled cross-sectional time series design. Separate analyses are performed on each Soviet leadership period, and on alternative estimates of Soviet economic aid extensions prepared by the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency, and British analyst Quintin Bach.