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Politics, process, and American trade policy: Congress and the regulation of foreign commerce

Posted on:1991-04-08Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of California, San DiegoCandidate:O'Halloran, Sharyn LeeFull Text:PDF
GTID:1476390017452095Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:
My dissertation examines alternative models for explaining American trade policy. For the most part, there are two conventional models. A pressure group model which argues that members of Congress are held captive by politically influential groups demanding protection from import competition. And a presidential-ascendency model which holds that with the passage of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) and the ascendency of the executive in the decision-making process, Congress has abdicated to the executive its authority over trade policy. Neither model, however, is entirely supported by the empirical evidence.; In contrast to these standard views, I argue that Congress and congressional politics greatly influence trade policy. Recent developments in the regulatory literature, known as the New Economics of Organizations (NEO), hold that Congress is neither held captive by pressure groups nor dominated by executive decision-making. Rather, congressional politics and the institutional arrangements designed by Congress play a key role in determining economic policy.; My purpose is to test these standard models and explore the implications of NEO for how Congress regulates international trade. First, I test the pressure group model, which states that early fluctuations in tariff levels reflect changing group demands. I find that party politics in Congress also affects trade policy. Second, I test a presidential ascendency model. I find that when Congress delegates authority, it designs procedures to restrict the actions of the executive. Further, I find that through these procedures Congress can influence the substance of international trade agreements. These are not conclusive tests that Congress makes trade policy. But they do allow me to at least partially reject the standard views and show that NEO is consistent with the evidence, it explains both early and contemporary American trade policy and requires fewer assumptions to do so.
Keywords/Search Tags:Trade policy, Congress, Politics, Model
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