| In the past decade new and old democracies have eroded. Democratically elected presidents across the world have used their popularity to introduce constitutional amendments that over time destroy the system of checks and balances, hinder free and fair elections, and undermine political rights and civil liberties. Some of these presidents have eroded democracy. Despite similarities, others, however, have not been able to do the same. Why are some presidents able to erode democracy while others are not?;Scholars have mostly focused on sudden democratic breakdowns. My dissertation analyzes a different, more gradual, type of regime change, with a clear rupture, leading to a competitive authoritarian regime. I conceptualize the erosion of democracy in two stages. The first focuses on the likelihood of electing presidents with hegemonic aspirations, who try to enhance their powers and extend their time in office beyond a second term. The second focuses on the circumstances that make it possible-or not-for these presidents to erode democracy. Using an original database with information on constitutional amendments introduced by democratically elected Latin American presidents since 1978, I show that economic crises, inchoate party systems, and weak states increase the likelihood of electing hegemonic leaders. However, these factors cannot predict whether they succeed or fail in their attempts to erode democracy.;In order to assess that, the outcome of the second stage, I focus on the opposition. Existing literature on democratic reversals has paid little attention to the opposition's behavior. My dissertation shows that this neglect is a mistake. Because democratic erosion happens gradually, the opposition has many opportunities to respond. Its strategies and goals, I argue, are critical to understand why some presidents successfully undermine democracy, while others do not.;I develop this argument, using comparative historical analysis focusing on the cases of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia (2002--10) and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (1999--2013). Employing interviews and archival data from newspapers and congress, collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Bogota and Caracas, I show that when the opposition uses extra-institutional strategies with radical goals, it provides the president with "legitimate" reasons to remove opposition leaders from office, prosecute them, and jail them. It allows him to push for more aggressive reforms that, without a presence in the legislature and the courts, the opposition cannot stop. Conversely, when the opposition uses institutional strategies or extra-institutional strategies with moderate goals, it is able to keep a presence in the legislature and slow down the government's cooptation of courts and oversight agencies, thus reducing the likelihood that the president will have the institutional control needed to pass more aggressive reforms. |
