Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Afric

The democratization and market reforms that were implemented across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s were intended to disperse political and economic power away from the ruling elite. In a comparison study of Ghana and Benin - two of Africa's most stable democracies - this dissertation shows that neither goal is achieved where the private sector is weak. The result, as demonstrated by the case of Benin, is insider democracy: fully democratic institutions are in place, but government insiders predominate among the political elite; those without pre-existing ties to the state are unlikely to win office. Ghana, with greater private sector strength and many fewer insiders in office, serves as the counterfactual.;The analysis draws on interviews with 128 Members of Parliament (64 in each Ghana and Benin) to document the professional trajectories of the political elite and how they got started in electoral politics. Longitudinal exports data, in combination with population and business census data, are used to demonstrate variation in private sector strength and to understand its sources.;The concluding chapter compiles biographical data on top presidential candidates in Africa's competitive democracies to demonstrate that Africa's competitive democracies are more like Benin than Ghana. Insider rule is the predominant pattern in the region, and this dissertation argues that the cause is private sector weakness rather than institutional structure or poverty per se.