Exploring the efficacy of the United States Army Readiness Assessment Program to reduce accidents/mishaps

The purpose of this sequential explanatory mixed methods design study was to explore the efficacy of the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program to reduce accidents. Specifically, the goals of the study were to (a) examine the difference between the number U.S. Army accidents reported before and after implementing the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program; (b) examine the potential relationship between safety climate, as measured by the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program, and U.S. Army accidents/mishaps; and (c) identify factors that contribute to or impede the success of the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program. In line with Brinkerhoff's (2003) success case method (SCM) the research was conducted, in two phases, quantitative followed by qualitative, using preexisting data. The data was obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the U.S. Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center databases. The population included U.S. Army personnel, Soldiers and Civilians, stationed either in the continental United States or abroad (to include deployed personnel in a combat zone and/or setting). The theories, models, and practices found in the performance improvement/HPT model coupled with the safety climate and safety culture literature served as the theoretical framework for the study. A difference of 704 U.S. Army accidents or a 42.3% reduction was found between the number of U.S. Army accidents reported before and after implementing the U. S. Army Readiness Assessment Program. Additionally, a negative non-statistically significant relationship was found between safety climate, as measured by the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program, and U.S. Army accidents at the p =0.05 level of significance. The qualitative findings (a) suggest that all three phases (Assessment, De-Brief, and Follow-Up) of the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program worked; (b) provide further support for Gilbert's (1978) argument that the absence of performance support (not skills and knowledge) is the greatest block to exemplary work performance, whereas performance support factors contributed to or impeded the success of the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program; and (c) suggest the U.S. Army Readiness Assessment Program contributed to changes in the U.S. Army's safety culture and safety performance. The researcher concluded with recommendations for further research.