Food aid as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy: The case of Ethiopia, 1982-1984. (Volume I of II)

The United States grows and exports more food than any other nation in the world. It is also the world's largest food donor. U.S. food aid has become an "instrument" of U.S. foreign policy. This dissertation argues that U.S. food aid is inherently political, not humanitarian, and is used to further the political interests of the state. As such it may be used to win support from other governments or to subvert them. Between 1982-1984, Africa suffered its worst food crisis of this century. Ethiopia became a symbol of this tragedy. By 1983, more than seven million Ethiopians were suffering from famine. But Ethiopia's Marxist government was the Soviet Union's largest client state in Africa. The Reagan Administration was avowedly anti-Communist--calling the Soviet Union the "evil empire"--with a foreign policy predicated on supporting indigenous "freedom fighters" to halt Soviet expansion on the periphery of that empire. Using Ethiopia as a paradigm, this dissertation explores the political history of the use of food as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It proposes that U.S. food surpluses have been used as anti-Communist instruments since 1918. Following the history of this policy, the Reagan Administration perceived Ethiopia as part of the expanding Communist empire. It therefore put into place in Ethiopia in 1982-1984 two policies, one overt and one covert, using U.S. food aid as a political instrument. This dissertation argues that the Reagan Administration deliberately delayed and withheld food aid from the Ethiopian government over the course of almost 24 months. At the same time, the administration increased food aid to anti-government guerrillas in an effort to destabilize and possibly topple the Marxist government. Ethiopia, therefore, illustrates the political use of U.S. food aid both as an anti-Communist foreign policy instrument and as an instrument of political destabilization.