Reagan's foreign policy: A case study of Lebanon, 1982-1984

The United States played a decisive role in the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, notably in its attempt to disengage the deadlocked parties in Beirut. support the Lebanese government in restoring order, and arrange for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The U.S. in conjunction with France and Italy formed the Multinational Peacekeeping Force (MNF) and deployed them in Beirut in order to stabilize the volatile and chaotic domestic situation that had ensued in the wake of the invasion. In addition, the U.S. brokered the 17 May 1983 Agreement to bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon.; This study seeks to examine the causes that precipitated U.S. failure in Lebanon between 1982--1984. It dwells on the miscalculations and misperceptions committed by the Reagan administration such that after eighteen months of MNF presence in Beirut, the country regressed to an internecine civil war. This led to a breakdown in Lebanese society and the disintegration of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The U.S. commitment of troops and diplomacy in Lebanon, and the region, after backing the Israeli invasion of the country, ended in failure and confusion. It was accompanied by a loss in American lives, and by a decline in U.S. influence in Lebanon and the region.; The thesis developed in the present study is that the failings of US policy in Lebanon were function of the decision making process that dominated the Reagan White House and shaped US policy interests in Lebanon and the Middle East in the period under consideration. On the basis of this thesis, this dissertation proceeds to examine the role of the President, the leverage of his main policy makers and the broader domestic, regional and international setting of US policy. It also seeks to clarify the relationship between decision making processes and policy choices and outcomes. The latter is integral to the methodology adopted in the present work. This methodology consists of an internal critique and comparison of three dominant conceptual frameworks of decision making. These include realist, bureaucratic and cognitive theories. The first is significant for the analysis of international systems The second is relevant to the analysis of interdepartmental relations in government, and the third is central to decision making at the presidential level. In addition, the methodology employed in this dissertation involves a systematic inquiry into primary and secondary sources, published as well as unpublished documents.; Finally, this thesis concludes that the present case is relevant to other instances of foreign policy decision-making in the Reagan Administration, notably those associated with US policy in Central America and in Iran.