| Enforcement discretion in Common Law jurisdictions derives from the criminal prosecutorial discretion. In Civil Law jurisdictions it is little studied, although it is an essential element of administrative discretion in any Western legal tradition.; Chapter one of the dissertation provides a review of administrative discretion in Civil Law countries. In addition, the different systems used to control discretion in continental Europe and the United States are compared.; Chapter two analyzes the nature of the EEC and the Commission of the European Communities. The point made here is that the Communities are an administrative legal order and the Commission's discretion should be controlled by means similar to those used to control any other kind of administrative agency rather than placing excessive reliance on the European Parliament.; Chapter three reviews the antitrust procedure followed by the EEC Commission and analyzes all the relevant case-law of the European Court of Justice since 1954. The focus of the case-analysis is on antitrust enforcement. Additionally, whenever issues of enforcement discretion were dealt with by the Court, they are taken into consideration independently of their connection with antitrust. In the last part of chapter three the concept of enforcement discretion in European antitrust law is made clear and suggestions for the control of abuses are offered. Chapter three is updated to August, 1982.; Chapter four treats the United States antitrust enforcement system. After a review of the basic procedure followed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, a three-step analysis follows: first, prosecutorial discretion in American criminal law; second, enforcement discretion in American administrative law; third, enforcement discretion in American antitrust. The third part contains a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between substantive antitrust law and its enforcement. This provides an opportunity for a new conception of antitrust enforcement and the limits of judicial review in controlling failure to prosecute, dismissals, consent judgment and, generally, arbitrary enforcement.; The conclusions provide some comparison between the EEC and United States' antitrust enforcement and provide preliminary explanations concerning the different ways lobbying affects antitrust enforcement in the two systems. |
