BRINGING DUE PROCESS TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

The dissertation examines the attitudes and behavior of Social Security Administration Law Judges and concludes that much of the variation in their performance on the job can be explained by role conflict. The existence of role conflict is established by contrasting the expectations for the role held by the federal ALJ corps with those held by Social Security Administration. It is found that the federal ALJ corps expects a judicial approach to the position while the Social Security Administration expects the ALJs to adjust their legal methods to meet the needs of speed and efficiency in a bureaucracy processing massive numbers of claims and appeal hearings. The attitudes and behavior of the twenty-one-person sample of California ALJs, who were interviewed and observed in hearings, are then examined to determine their responses to the conflicting expectations. Although there is wide variation in their attitudes about numerous aspects of the role, the variation can be reduced to three distinct role orientations which form the basis for a typology of Social Security ALJs. When the behavior of the ALJs is analyzed, it is found that each type has a distinct approach to several important aspects of the job including: pre- and post hearing development; the conduct of the hearing; and overall productivity. However, no correlation is found between role type and reversal rates which suggests that the variation in reversal rates is not tied to role orientations or methods but rather to flaws in the program itself. Finally, explanations are sought for the ALJs' choice of role types and it is found that career paths prior to entering the Social Security ALJ corps are associated with the ALJs' orientation to and behavior in the role.