They surely had men at those guns: The development of United States field artillery 1907-1923

This dissertation examines the development of American field artillery in relation to those in Europe from the critical years 1907 to 1923. The work examines the doctrines, technology, debates, and capabilities that saw the field artillery become a separate branch of the United States Army in 1907 and a coequal branch with the infantry in 1923. The work starts off with an examination of the doctrinal concept of indirect fire that drove the creation of a separate field artillery branch, as well as the adoption of a School of Fire to train artillery officers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The work continues then in examining the army's struggle to expand its artillery inventory, its fixation on the 3-inch rapid fire light field gun, and its inability to successfully produce enough American-made materiel to equip the field artillery during the Great War. Much of the work examines the American artillery response to the conflict, examining American training for war, the failures of domestic industrial production, the difficulties in rationalizing open and positional warfare, and finally American artillery performance during the war. As a significant portion, almost half, of all American artillery units did not see combat before September 1918 the work uses the Meuse-Argonne Offensive as a case study in evaluating the performance of American field artillery across the spectrum of Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army units. Finally, the work concludes by examining the post war debates and improvements that occurred in a six year period between 1918 and 1923, culminating with the adoption of the Field Service Regulations of 1923. The work argues that World War I was a defining point in the existence of American field artillery, not just for the army as a whole. Pre-war and wartime failures in artillery can be traced to insufficient American industry as well as the failure of the American army to understand the realities of modern industrial warfare and the potential of modern artillery. It argues then that the Great that reshaped the army's thinking on artillery and saw it as a necessary versus ancillary arm.