THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION, EXPANSION, AND ESCAPE: INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND BUSINESS POWER IN U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY

Previous studies of the politics of United States' foreign trade policy have focused on the domestic aspect of the policy process. Schattschneider's analysis of the 1930 Tariff Act found that pressure groups dominated the policy process. In a later study of US international trade policy Bauer, Pool, and Dexter suggested that Congressional representatives are independent of interest group pressure and are able to choose the pressures to which they respond. Finally, from the perspective of international politics the argument is that American international trade policy enchances the autonomous role of the United States in international economic relations.; In contrast to the above domestic and international perspectives, this study suggests that US membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has reduced the ability of domestic protectionist interest groups to influence trade policy outcomes. It has also reduced the ability of the United States to act unilaterally with respect to establishing new trade barriers. The argument is that the US complies with the GATT to benefit both from the economic gains from trade and the stability of the international economic order. Exceptions to the GATT rules are accepted as legitimate by GATT members if deemed necessary to sustain social stability.; Case studies of three international trade policy decisions provide evidence for this argument. The first concerns industry government negotiations over the Textile White Paper in 1979 to reduce disruptive imports into the US. The second case focuses on the injury petition brought before the International Trade Commission by the Ford Motor Company and the United Autos Workers Union to reduce Japanese imports to the US. The third case deals with efforts by the telecommunications industry to restrict access to the US market.; Analysis of the cases led to the conclusion that the GATT agreements provided a framework in which a resolution to each conflict was found which did not reflect interest group demands nor the wishes of an "independent Congress". Adherence to GATT rules was also found to constrain the policy autonomy of the US. In the textile/apparel case and in the auto case, however, some protection of the American market was implemented to respond to domestic political pressures. The rationalization for this protection was to maintain domestic social stability, an argument accepted by GATT members as legitimate.