Access to protection: Democratic institutions, interest group politics, and international trade policy

This dissertation examines the role of democratic institutions in the shaping of trade policy, a topic largely ignored in previous studies of international trade. I introduce a general theory of institutional effects and apply it to trade policy. The theory argues the number of access points are the key institutional feature, where an access point is defined as any policymaker with power in setting trade policy and either independent or distinct preferences on trade policy, because increasing the number of access points will lower the costs of lobbying since it will be easier to find receptive targets of lobbying. Because of their inherent collective action advantage, protectionists will be better able to take advantage of this opening so that more access points will lead to more protectionism. Thus, for instance, coalition governments, undisciplined parties, and a large number of electoral districts will all lead to higher levels of protection.; The dissertation then tests these institutional hypotheses through three empirical investigations. First, I examine tariff rates in the post-World War II developed democracies using panel regression techniques, finding that institutions associated with more access points do yield more protectionist trade policy. Second, I examine the structure of protection within the European Union (EU) by conducting a statistical analysis of the tariff rates for different products negotiated by the EU during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). I find that products imported (exported) by countries with many access points tend to have higher (lower) tariff rates than those imported (exported) by countries with few access points. Finally, I examine trade policy in the United States in more detail. Through time-series estimation of U.S. tariff rates, I find that delegation to the President through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 led to lower tariff rates by reducing the role of Congress and, thus, lowering the number of access points. Further, investigation of interest group testimony before Congress on trade bills in the 19th and 20th century reveals that the protectionist advantage declined after the RTAA, supporting the microfoundations of the access point theory.