Investors' access to corporate management: A field experiment about 1-on-1-calls

Using a combination of field experimental, survey and archival empirical design, I study investors' access to corporate management in the context of public disclosure. Main findings include: (1) high willingness of senior management to engage in 1-on-1-calls with outsiders of the firm to discuss disclosure-related questions, (2) better corporate access when management's communication benefits are higher (3) quarterly quiet periods are not widely practiced and (4) lower information asymmetry and smaller return reactions pre-earnings release are associated with better management access. In my field experiment, 2,563 publicly-traded firms receive two identical emails seeking 1-on-1-calls to clarify MD&A related questions. Emails are sent from two distinct audiences, identifiable via web domain names, as (unknown) investors and consultants. Almost 58% of firms reply. A majority of responses come from senior management offering phone numbers and best times to call. Management access is lower for the consultant-audience which differs in perceived (proprietary) costs and (capital market) benefits from the investor-audience. To investors, management is more accessible when shareholder activism is high, short interest is low and MTB is low. Further, better management access is associated with reduced bid-ask spreads and lower informational content in stock prices shortly before earnings announcement. Together, this paper analyzes an important but academically uninvestigated source for gaining an enhanced understanding of public disclosure. It also serves as a starting point for a new line of work in disclosure-related accounting research that combines field experiments with archival empirical techniques to exploit randomized induced variation in real-world settings.