Research On Transboundary Pollution Regulation Mechanism Based On Central-local Regulatory Body

This paper studies the necessity of the choice of regulatory subjects in the Top-level Design of transboundary pollution regulation system using case analysis and the qualitative exposition of traditional literature method.It explains the important influence of the choice of the main body of regulation on the innovation of environmental governance system and the implementation effect of environmental policy in sovereign countries.The research on the transboundary pollution mainly involves how to effectively provide and regulate the environmental public goods which divided by administrative boundaries.For many years,the mainstream view of environmental economics issues that the government's regulatory functions on the environment should be limited to the basic maintenance of market order,such as setting environmental standards,providing information platforms,and improving laws and regulations.The Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee proposed that the government should not only give full play to the guiding role of the government in the establishment of environmental governance mechanisms,but also study the specific impact of the implementation and improvement of public policies on ecological and environmental protection in light of relevant national policies and local conditions.The issue of the choice of the main body of environmental governance in my country and the different implementation effects that it may bring are formally brought into the sight of researchers and top designers.Taking the maximization of regional social welfare as the objective function,this paper aims to analyze the choice of regulation subject,which is one of the most basic elements in the design of transboundary air pollution control system.This paper starts from the heterogeneous two-way cross-border air pollutants,the transboundary pollution variables(that is,the transport coefficient of heterogeneous pollutants)are incorporated into the damage function,which extends the classical two-region environmental model.Then the game analysis method is introduced to find the optimal solutions of regional social welfare functions under cooperative and non-cooperative conditions respectively,the rationality and necessity of regional unified governance under cooperative game,that is,"Joint Defense and Joint Control" system,are demonstrated theoretically.This paper constructs the theoretical basis of the optimization scheme for the collaborative treatment of transboundary pollution,which takes the regional social welfare value as the objective function.Next step,relax the homogeneity assumptions of local regulatory subjects in the basic model,and bring more realistic regional heterogeneity variables,such as environmental utility,emission abatement cost and economic difference,into the model system.Then specifically analyze the selection strategies of Centralized-Jurisdictional regulatory subjects in regional transboundary pollution control.The dynamic programming method is used to solve the Bellman equation of the vertical policy and the jurisdictional policy respectively,and the various optimal time path and regional maximum welfare net present value under the two policies are obtained.The two results are compared and computer simulation are carried out.Based on heterogeneous regional variables and different constraints,the optimal regulatory subject selection schemes under various possible situations are discussed respectively.The main conclusions are as follows: under the concave marginal abatement cost(MAC)curve,the more cross-border spillover,meanwhile the greater regional environmental utility heterogeneity,and the greater the regional marginal abatement cost difference,the more effective the centralized policy.Vice versa.Then,taking the joint prevention and control mechanism of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as an example,the Air Quality Index(AQI)and six atmospheric panel data of the Ministry of Environmental Protection from 2013 to 2019 are selected,Difference-in Difference(DID)method is used to make an empirical analysis on the implementation effect of the environmental regulation policies of the central and local regulatory bodies.The result shows that the Super-Ministry system of Joint Defense and Joint Control has significantly reduced the air quality index and six atmospheric classification indexes in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region,that is,it has significantly improved the air quality in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region during the study period.Compared with the Yangtze River Delta region which is impacted by the same policy in the same period,the policy effect of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is more significant.The Event Study Method is used to test the parallel trend of each group of samples to ensure the effectiveness and stability of the empirical results,which basically confirms the conclusions of the theoretical analysis of the previous chapters,that is,the greater the regional differences,the more effective the centralized policy.For the reasons of the different implementation effects of two regulatory subjects' unified joint defense and joint control policy,taking into account the factors such as data availability and convenient quantitative analysis,this paper selects the marginal emission reduction costs of Carbon Monoxide(CO)and Sulfur Dioxide(SO2)mainly related to the industrial sector as the proxy variables for the differences in environmental governance of local administrative regions in the region.The specific analytical formula of the Directional Distance Function is estimated by the parameter analysis method,and the shadow prices of the marginal emission reduction costs of the above two kinds of air pollutants in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze River Delta region are calculated.According to the principle that the greater the standard deviation in the marginal emission reduction cost group,the greater the regional difference,whether in terms of the marginal control cost of carbon emissions or the marginal desulfurization cost,compared with the Yangtze River Delta region,the regional difference in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Group is greater.The above empirical results demonstrate that the central unified policy(joint prevention and control)of transboundary pollution is more effective in the regions with greater heterogeneity within the group.Qualitatively,the article introduces the experience cases of successful treatment of transboundary air pollution at home and abroad.The foreign part analyzes the development history of the air pollution management area of Southern California in the United States,the specific functions,administrative effectiveness,legal protection of the main body of regional regulation and the organizational structure of regional unified regulatory institutions.The domestic part analyzes the evolution of China's transboundary pollution control system and the specific implementation rules of the joint air pollution prevention and control mechanism.It is further explained that the effectiveness of the policy comes from the rationality of the system and the deepening of environmental governance policy reform mainly depends on the innovation of environmental regulation system.The innovation of sovereign domestic transboundary pollution regulation system fundamentally comes from the choice and integration of regulation subjects.This chapter qualitatively confirms the theoretical and empirical conclusions of the full text from the aspects of the system design and specific practice of the cross-administrative regulation subject and the regional unity policy,and further deepens the theme.The policy implications of the conclusion of the article are very clear.Judging from the characteristics of China's regional development and environmental regulations,regional gaps in cross-boundary pollution and environmental governance costs are widespread.The delema between economic development and environmental governance often leads to internal incentives for local governments to "free ride","environmental competition" and even "compete to the end".Based on the choice of the regulatory body,the organizational structure design for the treatment of cross-border pollution in my country should be set up under the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the "Regional Prevention and Control Department",with three main functional departments of law,law enforcement and monitoring,and unified design of cross-border at the regional level.Pollution control plan,and lead the promotion of resource price reform,regional transfer payment,environmental protection financial innovation,pollution emission trading and other market mechanisms.The legislative department prepares an air quality management plan every three years to strictly clarify the total amount of pollutant emissions and mandatory emission standards in the region;the law enforcement department is responsible for reviewing and issuing permits and monitoring the implementation of environmental protection plans and measures of various enterprises and institutions.Penalties will be imposed on violators;the monitoring department is responsible for monitoring and analyzing air quality and publishing the data on the platform of the authoritative department.The three departments work together to achieve effective control and recovery of cross-border pollution damage.It is necessary to give full play to the function of the Science and Technology Standards Department of the Ministry of Environmental Protection to protect and promote the progress of environmental protection technology,and to continuously strengthen the functions of the Publicity and Education Department of the Ministry of Environmental Protection to effectively organize,guide and coordinate the national environmental protection publicity and education work,and improve the public's willingness to pay the environmental products.